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a  b s t  r a c  t
Objective:  The late 2019  COVID-19 outbreak  has put the  health  systems  of many  countries  to the  limit
of their  capacity.  The  most  affected European  countries  are,  so  far,  Italy and Spain.  In  both  countries
(and others), the authorities  decreed a lockdown,  with  local  specificities.  The objective  of this  work is to
evaluate  the  impact of the  measures  undertaken in Spain  to deal  with  the  pandemic.
Method:  We  estimated  the  number  of cases  and  the  impact  of lockdown  on the reproducibility number
based  on the  hospitalization  reports  up  to April 15th  2020.
Results:  The estimated  number  of  cases  shows  a sharp increase until  the lockdown,  followed by  a slowing
down  and  then  a decrease  after full  quarantine  was implemented.  Differences  in the  basic reproduction
ratio are also  significant,  dropping  from  5.89 (95% confidence  interval  [95%CI]:  5.46-7.09)  before the
lockdown to 0.48 (95%CI:  0.15-1.17)  afterwards.
Conclusions: Handling a pandemic  like COVID-19 is complex and requires  quick decision  making. The
large  differences found  in the  speed  of propagation  of the  disease  show  us  that  being  able to implement
interventions  at the  earliest  stage is crucial  to minimise the  impact  of a potential  infectious  threat.  Our
work also  stresses  the  importance  of reliable  up to  date epidemiological  data in  order to accurately  assess
the  impact of Public Health  policies  on viral  outbreak.
©  2020  SESPAS. Published  by  Elsevier España,  S.L.U. This  is an open access article under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Análisis  del  impacto  del confinamiento  en el  número  de  reproducción







r e  s  u m  e  n
Objetivo: El  brote  de  COVID-19 a finales  de  2019 ha puesto los  sistemas  de  salud  de  muchos  países al
límite de  su  capacidad.  Los países europeos  más  afectados  son, hasta ahora,  Italia y  España.  En  ambos  (y
en  otros países),  las  autoridades decretaron  un confinamiento, con  especificidades  locales.  El objetivo de
este  trabajo  es evaluar el impacto  de  las medidas adoptadas  en  España para hacer  frente a  la pandemia.
Método:  Estimamos  el  número  de  casos  y  el  impacto  del confinamiento  en  el número  básico de  repro-
ducción  según  los informes  de  hospitalización hasta  el 15  de  abril de  2020.
Resultados:  El número  estimado de  casos muestra un fuerte aumento  hasta el bloqueo,  seguido de  una
desaceleración y  luego una  disminución  tras  la implementación  del confinamiento  total.  Las  diferencias
en  el  número  básico de  reproducción  también son  muy  significativas,  cayendo de  5,89  (intervalo de
confianza del  95%  [IC95%]:  5,46-7,09)  antes del  bloqueo  a 0,48  (IC95%:  0,15-1,17)  después.
Conclusiones:  Gestionar una  pandemia como la de  COVID-19 es muy  complejo  y  requiere una rápida
toma de  decisiones. Las  grandes  diferencias  encontradas en  la velocidad  de  propagación  de  la  enfermedad
muestran que  poder implementar  intervenciones en  la etapa  más temprana  es crucial  para  minimizar  el
impacto de una  potencial  amenaza.  Nuestro trabajo  también indica  la  importancia de  contar  con  datos
epidemiológicos  actualizados  y confiables para evaluar  con  precisión  el impacto  de  las  políticas  de  salud
pública en  la pandemia.
© 2020 SESPAS. Publicado  por  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U. Este  es un  artı́culo Open  Access bajo  la licencia
CC  BY-NC-ND  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: ahyafil@crm.cat (A. Hyafil).
Introduction
By late 2019 an outbreak of COVID-19, caused by SARS-Cov-
2 virus, started in the region of Hubei (China), more specifically
in  the city of Wuhan. Since then, the disease has spread all
over the world, being declared pandemic by the World Health
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gaceta.2020.05.003
0213-9111/© 2020 SESPAS. Published by  Elsevier España, S.L.U. This is  an open access article under the CC  BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
nd/4.0/).


























Figure 1. Normalized distribution for the latency from contamination to detected case, hospitalization and death event.
Organization on 2020 March 11th. The rapid propagation of the
virus around the world has stressed the health systems of many
countries to their limit. In Europe, the most affected countries in
terms of number of detected cases, hospitalizations and deaths are,
to the date, Italy and Spain. This unprecedented situation for the
public health systems of these countries forced decision makers
to act very quickly in  order to minimize the impact of the disease
and to avoid collapse. In Spain, the emergency state was  declared
on 2020 March 14th and was hardened with mandatory home
confinement except for vital sectors workers (including health pro-
fessionals, food supply, etc.) on March 30th. Under this situation,
it is urgent to assess the efficiency of social distancing and other
non-pharmaceutical interventions undertaken to  control the pan-
demics of COVID-19.1,2 One of the main challenges in evaluating
the impact of these actions is  that data are only partially available,
as many of the cases are asymptomatic or with mild symptoms,3
and shortage of testing kits prevent testing all patients with pos-
sible COVID-19 symptoms. Therefore, the number of cases might
be severely underestimated. This issue is common in epidemiol-
ogy and several methods have been recently proposed to  address
it under specific circumstances.4,5 Another issue is that, when no
massive viral testing of the population is  performed, new cases
are only detected once symptoms appear, at a  variable delay after
contamination. This complicates the assessment of the impact of
interventions to  reduce/slow down the spread of a  virus.
Here, we aimed at evaluating the impact of the COVID-19
related non-pharmaceutical interventions undertaken in Spain
over the basic reproduction ratio R0,  considering three periods
of time in 2020: no intervention (until March 13th), emergency
state (March 16-30th and April 13th-15th) and mandatory con-
finement (March 31st to  April 12th). We inferred retrospectively
the number of contamination in  each Spanish autonomous com-
munity from the patterns of hospitalizations, deaths and detected
cases. Analyses were performed with data up to April 15th 2020.
Methods
We  modelled the dynamics of infection with a discrete-time
SIR (Susceptible-Infected-Recovered) model with time-varying R0
defined for each region r and day d. We  also assumed the stock of
susceptible population S (r,  d) is almost constant through time at
S (r, d) ≈ Nr , (where Nr is the size of the total population in the
region; i.e. a small percentage of the population is contaminated)
as is probably valid up to  now. The dynamics of infected people
I (r, d) an region r  at day d thus varies as:
I (r, d + 1) = I (r, d) e(R0(r,d)−1) , (1)
where  is the recovery rate of the infection and R0 is a  stochas-
tic variable whose expected value is defined by  the ongoing social
distancing measures (no measure, state emergency or mandatory
confinement). Those three expected values are parameters that are
estimated from the reports. Formally, the priors over R0 for each
region are defined as independent Gaussian processes. The prior
mean is defined by the distancing measures, while the prior covari-
ance is squared exponential covariance K with variance 2 =  0.12
and length l = 1 day.6 Such prior allows to capture differences in
the spread between different regions as well as temporary change
of R0 within a  region (Gaussian processes enforce that these fluc-
tuations are smooth in time). The variance term 2 was set so it is
unlikely that  the infected population goes down in a single day by
a proportion larger than the recovery rate  . Based on the mean 20
days of contagious before recovery (duration of viral shedding7), we
set  =  0.05day−1. We  assumed that the value of infected people
at the beginning of the period studied (20th of February 2020) was
drawn from a  log-normal distribution with mean xi (r) and variance
1, where xi is  a parameter specific to  each autonomous community
(estimated from the data). This variability allowed us to capture
initial variations in  the spread of the epidemics at the beginning of
the period of study.
The number of new cases per day is N (r,  d) =  I (r, d) −
I (r,  d −  1) + I (r, d  − 1) = I (r, d) − (1 − ) I (r, d − 1). This true
number of cases however cannot be observed directly. Here
we use a  latent-state approach: we estimated the evolution
of the number of true cases in each autonomous community
based on the recorded accumulated number of detected cases,
hospitalizations and deaths provided by Instituto de Salud Carlos
III7. We used estimates for the proportion of cases pC that are
detected by the Spanish Health system, the proportion of cases
pH that  are hospitalized, and the lethality rate pD,  as the well as
the distribution of latency between infection and this three types
of events li (d) (Fig. 1). We  used the following estimates: 15% of
contaminated persons are hospitalized; 1% die from disease8,9; 30%
of cases get detected (this latter number was defined arbitrarily,
since the number of detected cases is  roughly twice the number of
hospitalizations). Note that these percentages affect the estimated
number of true cases by a  scaling factor, but do  not affect the
estimation of reproduction parameters. We used estimates of
the distribution of duration of infection-to-detection, infection-
to-hospitalization based on published literature.8,9 Lauer and
colleagues describe that the incubation period can be cap-
tured by log-normal distribution with median 5.1 days. To
capture the extra time from the apparition of symptoms to case
detection/hospitalization, we increased the median time of the
log-normal distribution by 50% for case detection and 100% for
hospitalization, i.e. 7.65 days and 10.2 days, respectively, while
keeping the same dispersion parameter . For infection-to-death,
we used the sum of two  gamma distributions for infection-to-
onset and onset-to-death with overall mean 23.9 days.10 Thus


























Figure 2. Number of estimated COVID-19 cases in Spain, inferred from the number of hospitalizations until April 15th 2020. The posterior mean of inferred cases is  plotted
in  blue. Cumulative number of detected cases, hospitalizations and deaths are plotted in green, red and black curves, respectively. Grey curves represent the inferred number
of  cases in each autonomous community. The onset of state of emergency and mandatory confinement are  indicated by  a vertical bar.
the expected numbers of events yi (r, d) in a  certain autonomous
communities is given by  convolving the pattern of new cases with
the distribution of infection-to-event:
E [yi (r,  d)] = pi
∑
t<d
N (c, t) li (d  −  t) (2)
E [yi (r, d)] =
∑
t<d
wd−t I (r, t) (3)
with wd = pi (li (d) − (1 − ) li (d  − 1)). We assumed that the actual
number of events recorded at that day and time was  drawn from
a  negative binomial distribution with mean E [yi (r, d)] as defined
above and parameter r = 2.10 The reports provide accumulated
time series, so in principle new events correspond to the difference
between two successive days. However new events are sometimes
reported later than on the day of occurrence (especially during
weekends). We  estimated that 30% of events were reported on
the following day, 10% two days later. Assigning this proportion
of events to one or two days before they are reported allowed
us to smooth the event time series. Finally, for the case of two
autonomous communities (Madrid and Castilla-La Mancha, until
April 12th for the latter), the reported number of hospitalizations
was not cumulative but corresponded to  the current number of
hospitalized patients related to COVID-19. For Castilla-La Mancha,
we found that we  could recover the reported cumulative number
of hospitalizations on April 12th by  assuming that the duration of
hospitalization is distributed uniformly between 5 and 15 days. We
used this rule to estimate the cumulative number of hospitaliza-
tions for this autonomous community, and applied it similarly for
Madrid.
There is a  debate about the reliability of these data. It  is
believed that hospitalizations report is the most reliable of these
indicators,11 as many cases go undetected (some patients are
asymptomatic or suffer mild symptoms; saturation of health sys-
tems have led to  testing only more severely affected patients in
some autonomous community), and some deaths are not integrated
in the official count because of the lack of viral charge testing.
There is indeed a  large variability between the fraction of hospi-
talizations per reported case between autonomous communities:
it is 31% in Galicia but  82% in  Comunidad de Madrid. This difference
is more likely to be  due to differences in detecting and reporting
cases rather than in  the true proportion of infected people requir-
ing hospitalization. It is also more difficult to assess reliably the
number of cases from death reports as the latency from infection
to death is long and can be very variable across individuals.
Parameters of the model, including the value of R0 in the
different conditions, were estimated from the data using an
expectation-maximization algorithm (see Appendix A  for details).
We  ran three alternative analyses: the principal analysis estimated
model parameters using hospitalizations reports; two  control
analyses were run using either detected cases or deaths reports,
which are  two less reliable indicators.
Results
We present the number of COVID-19 cases in  all 19 autonomous
communities inferred from the pattern of hospitalizations in
Figure 2 (see also Figure I in  the online Appendix for breakdown
by autonomous community). The estimated cases display a sharp
increase until the lockdown followed by a  plateau, and then a
decrease. We estimated the R0 before state of emergency, dur-
ing state emergency and during enforced lockdown. R0 was  found
to drop from 5.89 (95% confidence interval [95%CI]: 5.46-7.09) to
1.86 (95%CI: 1.10-2.63) after state of emergency, and down to 0.48
(95%CI: 0.15-1.17) after full lockdown. We  estimate a total num-
ber of 0.871 million COVID-19 cases in  Spain by April 15th 2020,
including 0.294 active cases, 0.559 recovered and 0.018 deceased
(see Fig. 3 for breakdown by autonomous community).
Estimates were similar when we used detected cases rather
than hospitalizations. Using detected case reports, we estimated
the R0 to be 6.91 (95%CI: 6.75-7.39) before the state of urgency, 2.22
(95%CI: 1.92-2.74) during the state of emergency and 0.85 (95%CI:
0.5-1.05) during the full lockdown. The estimate for the cumulative
number of cases was 0.823 million overall in Spain (0.351 million
active).
Because deaths occur after a  long and variable interval after
contamination, we  could not reliably estimate the value of R0
separately for the state emergency and full lockdown measures,
so we simply estimated R0 before and after declaring the state of
emergency. We  estimated the R0 to be 6.48 before the lockdown
(95%CI: 5.5-7.51), and 0.49 afterwards (95%CI: 0.16 - 1.57). The esti-
mate for the cumulative number of cases was 2.82 millions overall
in Spain (0.72 millions active).
Finally, we  assessed how  much our results depended on some of
our assumptions, using hospitalization reports. We estimated the
parameters using a  different pattern of delays of notification for
hospitalizations (50% reported on the same day; 20% on the next
day; 20% two  days later; 10% three days later). This change in  delays
induced a relatively small change in estimated R0: 5.60 before the
state of emergency (95%CI: 4.77-7.05), 1.66 (95%CI: 1.14-2.55) dur-
ing the state of emergency and 0.60 (95%CI: 0.13-1.35) during the
full lockdown. The assumed probability of hospitalizations had no
impact at all on the estimated R0,  and had an inversely proportional
influence on the estimated number of cases: assuming 7.5% of hos-
pitalizations instead of 15% would lead a  twofold increase in the
estimated number of cases.



























Figure 3. Cumulative number of cases in each autonomous community, and breakdown into active cases, recovered cases and deceased patients.
Discussion
We  found similar estimates of reproducibility number and the
proportion of the Spanish population contaminated by the new
coronavirus, whether they were estimated from hospitalization
numbers or detected cases. Both estimates from case reports and
hospitalizations suggest that  only mandatory quarantine achieved
R0 lower than 1, while R0 during state of emergency before non-
essential services were shut down was estimated to be well
beyond 1. This predicts that the opening of the non-essential ser-
vices by April 13 may  lead to a  new surge of cases. Based on this
empirical study, mandatory confinement is the only state-wise
measure that effectively reduces the number of contaminations.
Estimates based on death reports differed considerably from
those based on either hospitalizations or detected cases. This sug-
gests that some of the assumptions and data our modeling is based
on may  not be accurate (although commonly used in previous
studies), and shows that this can induce very large biases in  the
estimation of the propagation of the new coronavirus in  Spain.
A crucial pre-requisite for the reliability of our estimates is
that the proportion of events do not vary in  time. That was  likely
not the case neither for detected cases, as the testing policy evolved
during the period of study, nor for deaths, as the saturation of health
systems may  have led to higher death tolls and reporting of deaths
in retirement homes evolved. As  the proportion of hospitalized
cases is believed to  be  more stable across time, we believe that esti-
mates based on the latter are more reliable than estimates based
on either reported cases or deaths. Below, we further comment on
the results obtained with the hospitalization reports.
Our approach is similar to a study by an Imperial College team
published last week inferring the impact of non-pharmaceutical
measures (including lockdown) on propagation of the new
coronavirus in 11 European countries.10 Both studies rely on
fitting a model of infection dynamics to  observed data (here
hospitalizations). This contrasts with other approaches based on fit-





















































Figure 4. Increase in number of cases (in percent) for each autonomous community
in the 10 days following lockdown versus number of cases per  100,000 habitants at
the  time of lockdown.
in United States12 or patterns of cases in China13), or to  model simu-
lations studies that capture how the pattern of contacts in different
scenarios (with or without social distancing measures) affect virus
propagation.14–16,19 Other studies have also estimated the number
of cases from the reported deaths, assuming a  fixed duration from
infection to death.17
Our modeling approach included stochasticity in the repro-
ducibility number in  each area. This notably allows to capture
distinct trajectories of infection in  different areas. We  noted a
negative correlation across autonomous communities between
the proportion of infected people at the onset of state of  emer-
gency and the subsequent increase in infection (Fig. 4,  Pearson
coefficient: r  = −0.46, p =  0.048). In other words, R0 at the state
of emergency was smaller in the regions with more cases. This
could be due to a series of factors. First, the communities with
the largest proportion of cases could start developing herd immu-
nity, hence limiting the propagation of the infection (which seems
unlikely given that  in  the most affected autonomous communities,
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only a few percent have been infected according to our estima-
tions). It could also be the result of local policies taken before the
national lockdown in  the most affected autonomous communi-
ties, or a better compliance of lockdown and social distancing in
most affected areas. Another factor could be the migration from
the most affected (especially Madrid) to  less affected region before
lockdown was implemented,18 or some distortions in  the reporting
(under-reporting) of cases in  saturated health systems.
Our study has several important limitations. First, as noted pre-
viously, it is not  clear how reliable is the data the modeling is
based on both epidemiological reports, and infectious estimate
probability and latency of symptoms, case detection, hospital-
ization and death. It should be stressed that the unreliability of
epidemiologic data (with changes of criterion of inclusion along
time and between autonomous communities) induces important
biases which impede an accurate estimation of the impact of polit-
ical measures on  the propagation of the new coronavirus. A faster
and more reliable tracking of the epidemics could be performed
if cases were reported in a systematic way dated by  the onset of
symptoms rather than detection, as the incubation period has been
well characterized.
Second, the model captures the number of new cases each day
as a proportion from the pool of infected people in the same area.
It does not take into account how the age distribution in  each
area affects that each infection leads to  hospitalizations or death,
nor how the probability of infecting depends on the days from
infection.10 Nor does it take into account mobility between regions,
whose impact is believed to  be more important at the initiation of
the epidemics. It  is  also worth noting that in  a locked down environ-
ment where most contacts are compartmentalized in households,
it is possible that at beginning the virus continues to  spread rapidly
within households, but less so between households. As immu-
nity was not taken care here, R0 may  decrease significantly more
without further policies, after this first wave of within-household
contamination is over. Finally, we only modeled the impact of lock-
down, not of other measures which were taken too close apart
(banning public events, closing schools, etc.), and simultaneously
in most regions, so it is not possible here to  disentangle their effects
precisely. The analysis also did not take into account other changes
that have occurred during this period, such as measures at an indi-
vidual level or at the level of companies and local institutions (usage
of masks, hands washing, etc.).
In conclusion, the greatest interest should be focused on the
trends in R0 found in this work, which show drastic successive
reductions after the implementation of the state of urgency and
forced quarantines.
What is known about the topic?
The late 2019  Covid-19 disease outbreak has put the health
systems of many  countries to the limit of their capacity. The
objective of this work is to evaluate the impact of the measures
undertaken in Spain to deal with the pandemic.
What does this study add to the literature?
Using hospitalization reports, we estimate that the basic
reproduction number fell from 5.89 before the state of emer-
gency to 0.48 after full lockdown was implemented. Our  work
show as well the importance of  relying on update and reliable
epidemiologic data to  evaluate precisely the impact of public
health policies on the outbreak.
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